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Approval voting is a common method of preference aggregation where voters vote by ``approving'' of a subset of candidates and the winner(s) are those who are approved of by the largest number of voters. In approval voting, the degree to…
In an approval-based committee election, the goal is to select a committee consisting of $k$ out of $m$ candidates, based on $n$ voters who each approve an arbitrary number of the candidates. The core of such an election consists of all…
Population protocols are a model of distributed computation intended for the study of networks of independent computing agents with dynamic communication structure. Each agent has a finite number of states, and communication opportunities…
This paper describes COWPEA (Candidates Optimally Weighted in Proportional Election using Approval voting), a method of proportional representation that uses approval voting, also known as random priority, though underdeveloped in the…
American democracy is currently heavily reliant on plurality in single-member districts, or PSMD, as a system of election. But public perceptions of fairness are often keyed to partisan proportionality, or the degree of congruence between…
With the development of machine learning and Big Data, the concepts of linear and non-linear optimization techniques are becoming increasingly valuable for many quantitative disciplines. Problems of that nature are typically solved using…
Purpose: Multiwinner voting rules typically require full knowledge of voter preferences, which becomes impractical in large-scale or attention-limited settings. This paper investigates how accurately a winning committee can be approximated…
Proportional representation (PR) has long been believed the ideal system for the equality of individuals in apportioning the seats of a legislature body to subgroups. We observe that PR implicitly assumes the (standard) number of…
We identify a whole family of approval-based multi-winner voting rules that satisfy PJR. Moreover, we identify a subfamily of voting rules within this family that satisfy EJR. All these voting rules can be computed in polynomial time as…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in…
This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules and provide an axiomatic…
To choose a suitable multiwinner voting rule is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on the context, it varies widely what constitutes the choice of an ``optimal'' subset of alternatives. In this paper, we provide a quantitative analysis of…
We study online temporal voting, where a group of voters submit 0/1 approvals on sets of alternatives that arrive online over multiple rounds and a single alternative is chosen in each round. We introduce online variants of two well-known…
We consider the following problem in which a given number of items has to be chosen from a predefined set. Each item is described by a vector of attributes and for each attribute there is a desired distribution that the selected set should…
The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We…
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…
This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…