Related papers: Equilibrium concepts for time-inconsistent stoppin…
This paper studies the mean-field Markov decision process (MDP) with the centralized stopping under the non-exponential discount. The problem differs fundamentally from most existing studies on mean-field optimal control/stopping due to its…
This paper deals with a class of time inconsistent stochastic linear quadratic (SLQ) optimal control problems in Markovian framework. Three notions, i.e., closed-loop equilibrium controls/strategies, open-loop equilibrium controls and their…
In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an…
Inspired by recent work of P.-L. Lions on conditional optimal control, we introduce a problem of optimal stopping under bounded rationality: the objective is the expected payoff at the time of stopping, conditioned on another event. For…
We characterize the conditions under which a multi-time quantum process with a finite temporal resolution can be approximately described by an equilibrium one. By providing a generalization of the notion of equilibration on average, where a…
Experimental economics has repeatedly demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium makes inaccurate predictions for a vast set of games. Instead, several alternative theoretical concepts predict behavior that is much more in tune with observed…
This letter reports a novel application of game theory to quantum informational processes which can be used to optimally classify data generated by these processes. To this end, the notion of simultaneously distinguishing a pure quantum…
Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem…
We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our…
We analyze the conforming approximation of the time-harmonic Maxwell's equations using N\'ed\'elec (edge) finite elements. We prove that the approximation is asymptotically optimal, i.e., the approximation error in the energy norm is…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…
Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by…
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…
In this paper, we consider a novel $M$-ary sequential hypothesis testing problem in which an adversary is present and perturbs the distributions of the samples before the decision maker observes them. This problem is formulated as a…
The paper [12] examines a concept of equilibrium policies instead of optimal controls in stochastic optimization to analyze a mean-variance portfolio selection problem. We follow the same approach in order to investigate the Merton…
This paper develops a framework for establishing the existence of solutions to the equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (EHJB) equation arising in time-inconsistent stochastic control problems. The time-inconsistency in our setting arises…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…
This paper investigates a time-inconsistent portfolio selection problem in the incomplete mar ket model, integrating expected utility maximization with risk control. The objective functional balances the expected utility and variance on log…