Related papers: Envy-free division using mapping degree
We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality.…
We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus on allocations in which the swap of two items serves to…
We consider the problem of resolving the envy of a given initial allocation by adding elements from a pool of goods. We give a characterization of the instances where envy can be resolved by adding an arbitrary number of copies of the items…
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource. Recently, it was shown that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, it is possible to…
Given a graph $G$ with a terminal set $R \subseteq V(G)$, the Steiner tree problem (STREE) asks for a set $S\subseteq V(G) \setminus R$ such that the graph induced on $S\cup R$ is connected. A split graph is a graph which can be partitioned…
Envy-free cake-cutting protocols procedurally divide an infinitely divisible good among a set of agents so that no agent prefers another's allocation to their own. These protocols are highly complex and difficult to prove correct. Recently,…
We consider the house allocation problem, where $m$ houses are to be assigned to $n$ agents so that each agent gets exactly one house. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether an envy-free assignment exists, and if so,…
A dominating induced matching, also called an efficient edge domination, of a graph $G=(V,E)$ with $n=|V|$ vertices and $m=|E|$ edges is a subset $F \subseteq E$ of edges in the graph such that no two edges in $F$ share a common endpoint…
We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that finding the revenue…
Cake-cutting is a fundamental model of dividing a heterogeneous resource, such as land, broadcast time, and advertisement space. In this study, we consider the problem of dividing a discrete cake fairly in which the indivisible goods are…
Suppose that $n\neq p^k$ and $n\neq 2p^k$ for all $k$ and all primes $p$. We prove that for any Hausdorff compactum $X$ with a free action of the symmetric group $\mathfrak S_n$ there exists an $\mathfrak S_n$-equivariant map $X \to…
Fairly dividing a set of indivisible resources to a set of agents is of utmost importance in some applications. However, after an allocation has been implemented the preferences of agents might change and envy might arise. We study the…
We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in…
A graph is \emph{fan-crossing free} if it has a drawing in the plane so that each edge is crossed by independent edges, that is the crossing edges have distinct vertices. On the other hand, it is \emph{fan-crossing} if the crossing edges…
We prove several versions of N. Alon's "necklace-splitting theorem", subject to additional constraints, as illustrated by the following results. (1) The "almost equicardinal necklace-splitting theorem" claims that, without increasing the…
We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a multiset $\mathcal{M}$ of $t$ types of indivisible items among $d$ groups of agents, where all agents within a group have identical additive valuations. Gorantla et al. [GMV23] showed…
We study classic fair-division problems in a partial information setting. This paper respectively addresses fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods among agents with cardinal preferences. We will show that, for all of these…
We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each item. We, thus, make a distinction between items that are good…