Related papers: Hotelling Games with Multiple Line Faults

In this work, we provide a structural characterization of the possible Nash equilibria in the well-studied class of security games with additive utility. Our analysis yields a classification of possible equilibria into seven types and we…

We show a simple method for constructing an infinite family of graph formation games with link bias so that the resulting games admits, as a \textit{pairwise stable} solution, a graph with an arbitrarily specified degree distribution.…

Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…

We define and study a lending game to model the interbank money market, in which lending banks strategically allocate their cash to borrowing banks. The interest rate offered by each borrowing bank is within the interest rate corridor set…

Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…

In this paper, we consider a new network security game wherein an attacker and a defender are battling over "multiple" targets. This type of game is appropriate to model many current network security conflicts such as Internet phishing,…

In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…

We investigate the problem of equilibrium computation for "large" $n$-player games. Large games have a Lipschitz-type property that no single player's utility is greatly affected by any other individual player's actions. In this paper, we…

We propose a generic strategic network resource sharing game between a set of players representing operators. The players negotiate which sets of players share given resources, serving users with varying sensitivity to interference. We…

Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…

We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. The observed social network is thus…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…

Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…

We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which $n$ selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming that players…

In this paper we consider a stochastic game for modelling the interactions between smugglers and a patroller along a border. The problem we examine involves a group of cooperating smugglers making regular attempts to bring small amounts of…

We study the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in concurrent games played on graphs. While existence is guaranteed with safety objectives for each player, Nash equilibria need not exist when players are given arbitrary terminal-reward…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…