Related papers: Hotelling Games with Multiple Line Faults
Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…
We construct a finite deterministic graphical (DG) game without Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. This game has 3 players $I=\{1,2,3\}$ and 5 outcomes: 2 terminal $a_1$ and $a_2$ and 3 cyclic. Furthermore, for 2 players a…
Static potential games are non-cooperative games which admit a fictitious function, also referred to as a potential function, such that the minimizers of this function constitute a subset (or a refinement) of the Nash equilibrium strategies…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a…
In this paper, we propose a multi-player extension of the minimum cost flow problem inspired by a transportation problem that arises in modern transportation industry. We associate one player with each arc of a directed network, each trying…
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop model which…
We consider a network composed of two interfering point-to-point links where the two transmitters can exploit one common relay node to improve their individual transmission rate. Communications are assumed to be multi-band and transmitters…
We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
In this paper, we investigate the multiplayer General Lotto game across multiple battlefields, a significant variant of the Colonel Blotto game. In this version, each player employs a probability distribution for resource allocation,…
We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…
In order to understand if and how strategic resource allocation can constrain the structure of pair-wise competition outcomes in competitive human competitions we introduce a new multiplayer resource allocation game, the Population Lotto…
This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…
We consider a Markovian clearing queueing system, where the customers are accumulated according to a Poisson arrival process and the server removes all present customers at the completion epochs of exponential service cycles. This system…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
We study a network extension to the Nash bargaining game, as introduced by Kleinberg and Tardos (STOC'08), where the set of players corresponds to vertices in a graph $G=(V,E)$ and each edge $ij\in E$ represents a possible deal between…
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this…