Related papers: Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences
We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the…
Evolutionary agentic systems intensify the trade-off between computational efficiency and reasoning capability by repeatedly invoking large language models (LLMs) during inference. This setting raises a central question: how can an agent…
We propose and investigate a model for mate searching and marriage in large societies based on a stochastic matching process and simple decision rules. Agents have preferences among themselves given by some probability distribution. They…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…
The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting…
A characteristic of existing predictive process monitoring techniques is to first construct a predictive model based on past process executions, and then use it to predict the future of new ongoing cases, without the possibility of updating…
We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new…
Fixed-parameter tractability analysis and scheduling are two core domains of combinatorial optimization which led to deep understanding of many important algorithmic questions. However, even though fixed-parameter algorithms are appealing…
The Stable Roommates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SRTI) is a matching problem characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates, where the preferences may have ties or be incomplete. SRTI asks for a…
Given the ever-increasing complexity of adaptable software systems and their commonly hidden internal information (e.g., software runs in the public cloud), machine learning based performance modeling has gained momentum for evaluating,…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
While the existence of a stable matching for the stable roommates problem possibly with incomplete preference lists (SRI) can be decided in polynomial time, SRI problems with some fairness criteria are intractable. Egalitarian SRI that…
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable roommate assignments in two models: (i) the $k$-attribute model, in which the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors"…
Consider the standard hospitals/residents problem, or the two-sided many-to-one stable matching problem, and assume that the true preference lists of both sides are complete and strict. The lists actually submitted, however, are truncated.…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…