Related papers: Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
When machine learning systems meet real world applications, accuracy is only one of several requirements. In this paper, we assay a complementary perspective originating from the increasing availability of pre-trained and regularly…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \cite{fox2010qe}. This article reveals that combining unmatched agents,…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
We study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces (DivorceSM) problem of deciding, given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching $M$ , whether there exists a stable matching which is reachable from $M$ by divorce operations as…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
Updating machine learning models with new information usually improves their predictive performance, yet, in many applications, it is also desirable to avoid changing the model predictions too much. This property is called stability. In…
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the $k$-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors", or by Euclidean distances…
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
Sequential algorithms for the Stable Matching Problem are often too slow in the context of some large scale applications like switch scheduling. Parallel architectures can offer a notable decrease in runtime complexity. We propose a stable…
Advances in the effectiveness of machine learning models have come at the cost of enormous complexity resulting in a poor understanding of how they function. Local surrogate methods have been used to approximate the workings of these…
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI,…
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
Suppose each of $n$ men and $n$ women is located at a point in a metric space. A woman ranks the men in order of their distance to her from closest to farthest, breaking ties at random. The men rank the women similarly. An interesting…