Related papers: Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences
Fitting models with high predictive accuracy that include all relevant but no irrelevant or redundant features is a challenging task on data sets with similar (e.g. highly correlated) features. We propose the approach of tuning the…
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…
Increasing aggregate diversity (or catalog coverage) is an important system-level objective in many recommendation domains where it may be desirable to mitigate the popularity bias and to improve the coverage of long-tail items in…
We present new integer linear programming (ILP) models for NP-hard optimisation problems in instances of the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SMTI) and its many-to-one generalisation, the Hospitals / Residents problem…
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distributional goals-such as multi-dimensional diversity quotas…
Large language models require consistent behavioral patterns for safe deployment, yet there are indications of large variability that may lead to an instable expression of personality traits in these models. We present PERSIST (PERsonality…
Tempered stable distributions are frequently used in financial applications (e.g., for option pricing) in which the tails of stable distributions would be too heavy. Given the non-explicit form of the probability density function,…
Reciprocal recommender systems (RRSs) are crucial in online two-sided matching platforms, such as online job or dating markets, as they need to consider the preferences of both sides of the match. The concentration of recommendations to a…
Time series are difficult to monitor, summarize and predict. Segmentation organizes time series into few intervals having uniform characteristics (flatness, linearity, modality, monotonicity and so on). For scalability, we require fast…
In this paper, we study the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC), where a solution is a stable matching or a report that none exists. We present a novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…
The exact computation of the matching distance for multi-parameter persistence modules is an active area of research in computational topology. Achieving an easily obtainable exact computation of this distance would permit multi-parameter…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
Focusing on Stable Roommates (SR) instances, we contribute to the toolbox for conducting experiments for stable matching problems. We introduce a polynomial-time computable pseudometric to measure the similarity of SR instances, analyze its…
We consider a non-stationary variant of a sequential stochastic optimization problem, in which the underlying cost functions may change along the horizon. We propose a measure, termed variation budget, that controls the extent of said…
Existing AI alignment approaches assume that preferences are static, which is unrealistic: our preferences change, and may even be influenced by our interactions with AI systems themselves. To clarify the consequences of incorrectly…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
Motivated by our collaboration with a major refugee resettlement agency in the U.S., we study a dynamic matching problem where each new arrival (a refugee case) must be matched immediately and irrevocably to one of the static resources (a…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…