Related papers: A Dynamic Game Framework for Rational and Persiste…
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…
We investigate the equilibrium stability and robustness in a class of moving target defense problems, in which players have both incomplete information and asymmetric cognition. We first establish a Bayesian Stackelberg game model for…
Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model where each player's type parameter characterizing its own objective is private information: each player knows its own type but not its rivals' types, and Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is…
In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…
We consider shared workspace scenarios with humans and robots acting to achieve independent goals, termed as parallel play. We model these as general-sum games and construct a framework that utilizes the Nash equilibrium solution concept to…
We consider distributed learning problem in games with an unknown cost-relevant parameter, and aim to find the Nash equilibrium while learning the true parameter. Inspired by the social learning literature, we propose a distributed…
We consider in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information with the following features. The underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's…
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…
We study the problem of Bayesian learning in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with asymmetric information. In a series of seminal papers in the literature, this problem has been investigated under a simplifying model where…
Multi-team games, prevalent in robotics and resource management, involve team members striving for a joint best response against other teams. Team-Nash equilibrium (TNE) predicts the outcomes of such coordinated interactions. However, can…
We consider scenarios where a worker robot, who may be unaware of the human's exact expectations, may have the incentive to deviate from a preferred plan (e.g. safe but costly) when a human supervisor is not monitoring it. On the other…
This paper considers for the first time pursuit-evasion (PE) differential games with irrational perceptions of both pursuer and evader on probabilistic characteristics of environmental uncertainty. Firstly, the irrational perceptions of…
In the domain of machine learning and game theory, the quest for Nash Equilibrium (NE) in extensive-form games with incomplete information is challenging yet crucial for enhancing AI's decision-making support under varied scenarios.…
In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric $N$-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential…
Nash Equilibrium and its robust counterpart, Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium (DRNE), are fundamental problems in game theory with applications in economics, engineering, and machine learning. This paper addresses the problem of…
In socio-technical multi-agent systems, deception exploits privileged information to induce false beliefs in "victims," keeping them oblivious and leading to outcomes detrimental to them or advantageous to the deceiver. We consider…
We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…
Robots deployed in real-world environments should operate safely in a robust manner. In scenarios where an "ego" agent navigates in an environment with multiple other "non-ego" agents, two modes of safety are commonly proposed --…
To facilitate effective, safe deployment in the real world, individual robots must reason about interactions with other agents, which often occur without explicit communication. Recent work has identified game theory, particularly the…
In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE). In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider…