Related papers: A Dynamic Game Framework for Rational and Persiste…
This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…
We consider a non-zero-sum linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) dynamic game with asymmetric information. Each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world $V$, resulting in dependent private observations. We study…
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are facing a fast-growing wave of attacks. To achieve effective proactive defense, this paper models honeypot deployment as a gamma-fixed signaling game in which node liveness serves as the only signal and…
In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for…
We study strategic interaction in linear-quadratic network games where agents act on subjective, misspecified models of their environment. Agents observe noisy aggregate signals generated by local network externalities and interpret them…
We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria…
Non-cooperative dynamic game theory provides a principled approach to modeling sequential decision-making among multiple noncommunicative agents. A key focus has been on finding Nash equilibria in two-agent zero-sum dynamic games under…
Defensive deception techniques have emerged as a promising proactive defense mechanism to mislead an attacker and thereby achieve attack failure. However, most game-theoretic defensive deception approaches have assumed that players maintain…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
In this paper, we propose a numerical methodology for finding the closed-loop Nash equilibrium of stochastic delay differential games through deep learning. These games are prevalent in finance and economics where multi-agent interaction…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…
We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel setting using which many emerging problems in next-generation electricity markets can be readily modeled. Repeated playing affords the players a…
We propose the Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium (SCNE), a refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for multi-stage games. SCNE retains the internal credibility requirement of SPNE -- equilibrium behavior in every subgame --…
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…
Decoding how rational agents should behave in shared systems remains a critical challenge within theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and economics studies. Central to this challenge is the task of computing the solution…
In this letter, we study dynamic game optimal control with imperfect state observations and introduce an iterative method to find a local Nash equilibrium. The algorithm consists of an iterative procedure combining a backward recursion…
Information gathering while interacting with other agents under sensing and motion uncertainty is critical in domains such as driving, service robots, racing, or surveillance. The interests of agents may be at odds with others, resulting in…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…