Related papers: Dynamically Stable Matching
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
We consider the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences, a problem originally proposed by Knuth. Despite extensive study of the problem by experts from different areas, the question of whether every instance of…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties $p$ under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural…
The Stable Marriage Problem is to find a one-to-one matching for two equally sized sets of agents. Due to its widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized match maker, a very large number of…
The stable marriage problem has been introduced in order to describe a complex system where individuals attempt to optimise their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. Due to the potential large applicability of…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions…
Super-stability and strong stability are properties of a matching in the stable matching problem with ties. In this paper, we introduce a common generalization of super-stability and strong stability, which we call non-uniform stability.…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be…
This paper proposes a new one-sided matching market model in which every agent has a cost function that is allowed to take a negative value. Our model aims to capture the situation where some agents can profit by exchanging their obtained…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
We study a dynamic model of the relationship between two people where the states depend on the "power" in the relationship. We perform a comprehensive analysis of stability of the system, and determine a set of conditions under which stable…
Most finance studies are discussed on the basis of several hypotheses, for example, investors rationally optimize their investment strategies. However, the hypotheses themselves are sometimes criticized. Market impacts, where trades of…