Related papers: Correlation in Extensive-Form Games: Saddle-Point …
We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this setting, optimal CEs require history-dependent policies; this…
Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form…
We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria…
The sequence form, owing to its compact and holistic strategy representation, has demonstrated significant efficiency in computing normal-form perfect equilibria for two-player extensive-form games with perfect recall. Nevertheless, the…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium for imperfect-information extensive-form games (EFGs) that enforces consistency between the two components of a solution: agents' strategy profile describing their…
Normal-form proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson as a refinement of normal-form perfect equilibrium, occupies a distinctive position in the equilibrium analysis of extensive-form games because its more stringent perturbation structure…
We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…
Dynamic games are powerful tools to model multi-agent decision-making, yet computing Nash (generalized Nash) equilibria remains a central challenge in such settings. Complexity arises from tightly coupled optimality conditions, nested…
Saddle point with a given Morse index on a potential energy surface is an important object related to energy landscape in physics and chemistry. Efficient numerical methods based on iterative minimization formulation have been proposed in…
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…
Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as a reliable predictor of outcomes, with two of the most…
The Nash Equilibrium (NE), one of the elegant and fundamental concepts in game theory, plays a crucial part within various fields, including engineering and computer science. However, efficiently computing an NE in normal-form games remains…
Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to…
Markov games model interactions among multiple players in a stochastic, dynamic environment. Each player in a Markov game maximizes its expected total discounted reward, which depends upon the policies of the other players. We formulate a…
Solution concepts such as Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria are useful components for many multiagent machine learning algorithms. Unfortunately, solving a normal-form game could take prohibitive or…