Related papers: Reachability Games in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a logic that models information change in a multi-agent setting through the use of action models with pre- and post-conditions. In a recent work, DEL has been extended to first-order epistemic logic (DFOEL),…

Two-player, turn-based, stochastic games with reachability conditions are considered, where the maximizer has no information (he is blind) and is restricted to deterministic strategies whereas the minimizer is perfectly informed. We ask the…

This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…

We propose an extension of Strategy Logic (SL), in which one can both reason about strategizing under imperfect information and about players' knowledge. One original aspect of our approach is that we do not force strategies to be uniform,…

The computability power of a distributed computing model is determined by the communication media available to the processes, the timing assumptions about processes and communication, and the nature of failures that processes can suffer. In…

In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…

We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among rational agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form games equipped with an interaction structure, which specifies which groups of players…

Approachability has become a standard tool in analyzing earning algorithms in the adversarial online learning setup. We develop a variant of approachability for games where there is ambiguity in the obtained reward that belongs to a set,…

Graph games are fundamental in strategic reasoning of multi-agent systems and their environments. We study a new family of graph games which combine stochastic environmental uncertainties and auction-based interactions among the agents,…

Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…

This paper investigates a reach-avoid game between two players with damped double integrator dynamics. An optimal state-feedback strategy is derived using a differential game framework combined with geometric analysis. To facilitate the…

Communication within groups of agents has been lately the focus of research in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). This paper studies a recently introduced form of partial (more precisely, topic-based) communication. This type of communication…

In a reachability-time game, players Min and Max choose moves so that the time to reach a final state in a timed automaton is minimised or maximised, respectively. Asarin and Maler showed decidability of reachability-time games on strongly…

We present a causality-based algorithm for solving two-player reachability games represented by logical constraints. These games are a useful formalism to model a wide array of problems arising, e.g., in program synthesis. Our technique for…

At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…

In general, finite concurrent two-player reachability games are only determined in a weak sense: the supremum probability to win can be approached via stochastic strategies, but cannot be realized. We introduce a class of concurrent games…

We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of "possible profiles" that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile.…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

There has been considerable work on reasoning about the strategic ability of agents under imperfect information. However, existing logics such as Probabilistic Strategy Logic are unable to express properties relating to information…