Related papers: Mechanism Design for Maximum Vectors
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
Distributed estimation that recruits potentially large groups of humans to collect data about a phenomenon of interest has emerged as a paradigm applicable to a broad range of detection and estimation tasks. However, it also presents a…
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
In this paper, we study the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs in a new game-theoretical environment. In contrast to other game-theoretical settings, we consider the case in which the value of the tasks…
An important yet challenging problem in numerical linear algebra is finding a principal submatrix with maximum determinant from a given symmetric positive semidefinite matrix. This problem arises in experimental design, statistics, and…
This work proposes multi-agent systems setting for concurrent engineering system design optimization and gradually paves the way towards examining graph theoretic constructs in the context of multidisciplinary design optimization problem.…
This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an online algorithm to an offline benchmark in worst-case over…
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines…
This paper addresses a large class of vector optimization problems in infinite-dimensional spaces with respect to two important binary relations derived from domination structures. Motivated by theoretical challenges as well as by…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We consider two graph optimization problems called vector domination and total vector domination. In vector domination one seeks a small subset S of vertices of a graph such that any vertex outside S has a prescribed number of neighbors in…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
In this paper, a multi-agent coordination problem with steady-state regulation constraints is investigated for a class of nonlinear systems. Unlike existing leader-following coordination formulations, the reference signal is not given by a…
In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size $k$ among a group of $n$ is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of…
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the…
Determinant maximization provides an elegant generalization of problems in many areas, including convex geometry, statistics, machine learning, fair allocation of goods, and network design. In an instance of the determinant maximization…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
Given a network of agents, we study the problem of designing a distributed algorithm that computes k independent weighted means of the network's initial conditions (namely, the agents agree on a k-dimensional space). Akin to average…
In this paper, a novel distributed optimization framework has been proposed. The key idea is to convert optimization problems into optimal control problems where the objective of each agent is to design the current control input minimizing…