Related papers: Mechanism Design for Maximum Vectors
Recently wide application in engineering-economic problems was received with problems of vector optimization. Development of methods of the decision of these problems it is executed in works A. Messac and others. Complexity of the offered…
It is a very challenging task to identify the objectives on which a certain decision was based, in particular if several, potentially conflicting criteria are equally important and a continuous set of optimal compromise decisions exists.…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
Given a graph $G=(V,E)$ of order $n$ and an $n$-dimensional non-negative vector $d=(d(1),d(2),\ldots,d(n))$, called demand vector, the vector domination (resp., total vector domination) is the problem of finding a minimum $S\subseteq V$…
We consider distributed optimization as motivated by machine learning in a multi-agent system: each agent holds local data and the goal is to minimize an aggregate loss function over a common model, via an interplay of local training and…
We study the dominating set problem in an online setting. An algorithm is required to guarantee competitiveness against an adversary that reveals the input graph one node at a time. When a node is revealed, the algorithm learns about the…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
We analyze the optimal delegation problem between a principal and an agent, assuming that the latter has state-independent preferences. We demonstrate that if the principal is more risk-averse than the agent toward non-status quo options,…
We consider the {\em vector partition problem}, where $n$ agents, each with a $d$-dimensional attribute vector, are to be partitioned into $p$ parts so as to minimize cost which is a given function on the sums of attribute vectors in each…
This paper is concerned with the problem of designing agents able to dynamically select information from multiple data sources in order to tackle tasks that involve tracking a target behavior while optimizing a reward. We formulate this…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove…
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…
In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…
In this paper, we investigate a constrained optimal coordination problem for a class of heterogeneous nonlinear multi-agent systems described by high-order dynamics subject to both unknown nonlinearities and external disturbances. Each…
Several fundamental problems that arise in optimization and computer science can be cast as follows: Given vectors $v_1,\ldots,v_m \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and a constraint family ${\cal B}\subseteq 2^{[m]}$, find a set $S \in \cal{B}$ that…
Mechanism design is a central research branch in microeconomics. An effective mechanism can significantly improve performance and efficiency of social decisions under desired objectives, such as to maximize social welfare or to maximize…
This paper is concerned with the distributed linear quadratic optimal control problem. In particular, we consider a suboptimal version of the distributed optimal control problem for undirected multi-agent networks. Given a multi-agent…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause…