Related papers: Mechanism Design for Maximum Vectors
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are $N$ projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent…
We study a model of delegation in which a principal takes a multidimensional action and an agent has private information about a multidimensional state of the world. The principal can design any direct mechanism, including stochastic ones.…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
This note is devoted to the distributed optimization problem of multi-agent systems with nonconvex velocity constraints, nonuniform position constraints and nonuniform stepsizes. Two distributed constrained algorithms with nonconvex…
A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents,…
We study a dynamic stochastic control problem subject to Knightian uncertainty with multi-objective (vector-valued) criteria. Assuming the preferences across expected multi-loss vectors are represented by a given, yet general, preorder, we…
Consider a principal who wants to search through a space of stochastic solutions for one maximizing their utility. If the principal cannot conduct this search on their own, they may instead delegate this problem to an agent with distinct…
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve resource allocations. Self-interested agents may lie about their valuations if doing so increases their own utilities. Therefore, it is necessary to design mechanisms (collective…
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
We introduce an algorithm which, in the context of nonlinear regression on vector-valued explanatory variables, chooses those combinations of vector components that provide best prediction. The algorithm devotes particular attention to…
In this paper, we investigate the distributed optimal control problem for a kind of nonlinear multi-agent systems. In particular,both the state and the system dynamic structures of each agent are private and can only be shared among…
Large scale systems are forecasted to greatly impact our future lives thanks to their wide ranging applications including cooperative robotics, mobility on demand, resource allocation, supply chain management. While technological…
Non-prehensile manipulation in high-dimensional systems is challenging for a variety of reasons. One of the main reasons is the computationally long planning times that come with a large state space. Trajectory optimisation algorithms have…
In this paper, we explore the Mechanism Design aspects of the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs $(A\cup T, E)$. The set $A$ comprises agents, while $T$ represents tasks. The set $E$ is the private…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…