Related papers: Inference from Auction Prices
We address the problem of distributed cooperative localization in wireless networks, i.e. nodes without prior position knowledge (agents) wish to determine their own positions. In non-cooperative approaches, positioning is only based on…
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This…
We consider budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with additive valuation functions. For the divisible case, where agents can be allocated fractionally, there exists an optimal mechanism with approximation guarantee $e/(e-1)$…
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…
The system operator's scheduling problem in electricity markets, called unit commitment, is a non-convex mixed-integer program. The optimal value function is non-convex, preventing the application of traditional marginal pricing theory to…
A popular formalism for multiagent control applies tools from game theory, casting a multiagent decision problem as a cooperation-style game in which individual agents make local choices to optimize their own local utility functions in…
We present different versions of a conjecture which would express that first price mechanisms never work very badly in a very general class of problems. The definitions include most of the problems where there is a principal (seller) who…
The Kelly or proportional allocation mechanism is a simple and efficient auction-based scheme that distributes an infinitely divisible resource proportionally to the agents bids. When agents are aware of the allocation rule, their…
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…
This paper initiates a study into the century-old issue of market predictability from the perspective of computational complexity. We develop a simple agent-based model for a stock market where the agents are traders equipped with simple…
Game theory has been developed by scientists as a theory of strategic interaction among players who are supposed to be perfectly rational. These strategic interactions might have been presented in an auction, a business negotiation, a chess…
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be…
A widely applied diversification paradigm is the naive diversification choice heuristic. It stipulates that an economic agent allocates equal decision weights to given choice alternatives independent of their individual characteristics.…
The valuation process that economic agents undergo for investments with uncertain payoff typically depends on their statistical views on possible future outcomes, their attitudes toward risk, and, of course, the payoff structure itself.…
Real-time bidding, as one of the most popular mechanisms for selling online ad slots, facilitates advertisers to reach their potential customers. The goal of bidding optimization is to maximize the advertisers' return on investment (ROI)…
We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…
All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…
We show an auction-based algorithm to compute market equilibrium prices in a production model, where consumers purchase items under separable nonlinear utility concave functions which satisfy W.G.S(Weak Gross Substitutes); producers produce…
A standard result from auction theory is that bidding truthfully in a second price auction is a weakly dominant strategy. The result, however, does not apply in the presence of Cost Per Action (CPA) constraints. Such constraints exist, for…
In the mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of all agents' types. Traditionally, the designer may be in a dilemma in the…