A conjecture about the efficiency of first price mechanisms
Economics
2015-09-01 v3 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
We present different versions of a conjecture which would express that first price mechanisms never work very badly in a very general class of problems. The definitions include most of the problems where there is a principal (seller) who has the right to exclude others from the game. The exact definitions are motivated by the "first price mechanism" in E Cs: "Efficient Teamwork", but the conjecture is relevant for most auction problems, e.g. for combinatorial auctions.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1508.03651,
title = {A conjecture about the efficiency of first price mechanisms},
author = {Endre Csóka},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1508.03651},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
The conjecture is disproved in its original form by the author. The current status of the question is a part of the paper "Efficient Teamwork"