Related papers: Committee Selection with Attribute Level Preferenc…
We study the election of sequences of committees, where in each of $\tau$ levels (e.g. modeling points in time) a committee consisting of $k$ candidates from a common set of $m$ candidates is selected. For each level, each of $n$ agents…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…
We study the model of metric voting proposed by Feldman et al. [2020]. In this model, experts and candidates are located in a metric space, and each candidate possesses a quality that is independent of her location. An expert evaluates each…
Aggregating preferences under incomplete or constrained feedback is a fundamental problem in social choice and related domains. While prior work has established strong impossibility results for pairwise comparisons, this paper extends the…
In multiple-question referendum elections, the separability problem occurs when a voter's preferences on some questions or proposals depend on the predicted outcomes of others. The notion of separability formalizes the study of…
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that appear in imprecise-probabilistic decision…
Justified representation (JR) is a standard notion of representation in multiwinner approval voting. Not only does a JR committee always exist, but previous work has also shown through experiments that the JR condition can typically be…
Selectivity estimation - the problem of estimating the result size of queries - is a fundamental problem in databases. Accurate estimation of query selectivity involving multiple correlated attributes is especially challenging. Poor…
We study the following multiagent variant of the knapsack problem. We are given a set of items, a set of voters, and a value of the budget; each item is endowed with a cost and each voter assigns to each item a certain value. The goal is to…
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
There has been much recent work on multiwinner voting systems. However, sometimes a committee is highly structured, and if we want to vote for such a committee, our voting method should be more structured as well. We consider committees…
We consider the problem of estimating a ranking on a set of items from noisy pairwise comparisons given item features. We address the fact that pairwise comparison data often reflects irrational choice, e.g. intransitivity. Our key…
The property of proportional representation in approval-based committee elections has appeared in the social choice literature for over a century, and is typically understood as avoiding the underrepresentation of minorities. However, we…
Citizens' assemblies are an increasingly influential form of deliberative democracy, where randomly selected people discuss policy questions. The legitimacy of these assemblies hinges on their representation of the broader population, but…
This paper studies the design and analysis of approximation algorithms for aggregating preferences over combinatorial domains, represented using Conditional Preference Networks (CP-nets). Its focus is on aggregating preferences over…
Aggregating agent preferences into a collective decision is an important step in many problems (e.g., hiring, elections, peer review) and across areas of computer science (e.g., reinforcement learning, recommender systems). As Social Choice…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
We analyze the structure of the disagreement among a population of voters over a set of alternatives. Surveys typically ask either for pairwise comparisons, simple and intuitive for participants, or full rankings over alternatives,…