Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting
Abstract
Justified representation (JR) is a standard notion of representation in multiwinner approval voting. Not only does a JR committee always exist, but previous work has also shown through experiments that the JR condition can typically be fulfilled by groups of fewer than candidates. In this paper, we study such groups -- known as -justifying groups -- both theoretically and empirically. First, we show that under the impartial culture model, -justifying groups of size less than are likely to exist, which implies that the number of JR committees is usually large. We then present efficient approximation algorithms that compute a small -justifying group for any given instance, and a polynomial-time exact algorithm when the instance admits a tree representation. In addition, we demonstrate that small -justifying groups can often be useful for obtaining a gender-balanced JR committee even though the problem is NP-hard.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2108.12949,
title = {Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting},
author = {Edith Elkind and Piotr Faliszewski and Ayumi Igarashi and Pasin Manurangsi and Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin and Warut Suksompong},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.12949},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
Appears in the 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2022