We examine the following voting situation. A committee of k people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will submit a list of j candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee. We assume that j≤k<n. For a chosen committee, a given voter is said to be satisfied by that committee if her submitted list of j candidates is a subset of that committee. We examine how popular is the most popular committee. In particular, we show there is always a committee that satisfies a certain fraction of the voters and examine what characteristics of the voter data will increase that fraction.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1402.0861,
title = {Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies},
author = {Matt Davis and Michael E. Orrison and Francis Edward Su},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1402.0861},
year = {2014}
}