Related papers: Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms
In this paper we focus on providing sufficient conditions for some well-known stochastic orders in reliability but dealing with the discrete versions of them, filling a gap in the literature. In particular, we find conditions based on the…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzon (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their…
Organizations continuously accumulate data, often according to some business processes. If one poses a query over such data for decision support, it is important to know whether the query is stable, that is, whether the answers will stay…
We characterize the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms for the single facility location game in any unconstrained strictly convex space. A mechanism is \emph{group-strategyproof}, if no group of agents can misreport so that all its…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
Existence of an increasing quasi-concave value function consistent with given preference information is an important issue in various fields including Economics, Multiple Criteria Decision Making, and Applied Mathematics. In this paper, we…
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015]. However, it…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
This paper introduces assume/guarantee contracts on continuous-time control systems, hereby extending contract theories for discrete systems to certain new model classes and specifications. Contracts are regarded as formal characterizations…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which guarantees that the two sides be treated symmetrically. All…
This article aims to investigate sufficient conditions for the stability of stochastic differential equations with a random structure, particularly in contexts involving the presence of concentration points. The proof of asymptotic…
We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true…
In this technical note we consider a class of multi-agent network systems that we refer to as Open Multi-Agent Systems (OMAS): in these multi-agent systems, an indefinite number of agents may join or leave the network at any time. Focusing…
Toward explaining the persistence of biased inferences, we propose a framework to evaluate competing (mis)specifications in strategic settings. Agents with heterogeneous (mis)specifications coexist and draw Bayesian inferences about their…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…