Related papers: Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms
We study the interaction between strategy, heterogeneity and growth in a two-agent model of capital accumulation. Preferences are represented by recursive utility functions with decreasing marginal impatience. The stationary equilibria of…
We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted $\mathcal{R}_1$ and $\mathcal{R}_2$. In round $\mathcal{R}_1$, the capacity of each…
We study the market selection hypothesis in complete financial markets, populated by heterogeneous agents. We allow for a rich structure of heterogeneity: individuals may differ in their beliefs concerning the economy, information and…
In this paper, paired comparison models with stochastic background are investigated. We focus on the models that allow three options for choice. We estimate all parameters, the strength of the objects and the boundaries of equal decision,…
We extend well-known comparative results under expected utility to models of non-expected utility by providing novel conditions on local utility functions. We illustrate how our results parallel, and are distinct from, existing results for…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
The word stable is used to describe a situation when mathematical objects that almost satisfy an equation are close to objects satisfying it exactly. We study operator-algebraic forms of stability for unitary representations of groups and…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
This paper studies a many-to-one matching between individuals and institutions where institutions comprise multiple divisions and face cross-divisional constraints. We introduce a parametrized family of choice rules, which we call…
In this paper, we demonstrate that in many NP-complete variants of the stable matching problem, such as the Stable Hypergraph Matching problem, the Stable Multicommodity Flow problem, and the College Admission problem with common quotas, a…
Recent work has shown that models trained to the same objective, and which achieve similar measures of accuracy on consistent test data, may nonetheless behave very differently on individual predictions. This inconsistency is undesirable in…
We consider the problem of embedding a dynamic network, to obtain time-evolving vector representations of each node, which can then be used to describe changes in behaviour of individual nodes, communities, or the entire graph. Given this…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
We introduce a new class of functions, called Attractivity Guarantee (AG)-functions, to certify the attractivity of sets for uncertain nonlinear switched systems in discrete time. The existence of an AG-function associated with a set…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do…
We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In…