Related papers: Partial Verification as a Substitute for Money
We introduce a general approach based on \emph{selective verification} and obtain approximate mechanisms without money for maximizing the social welfare in the general domain of utilitarian voting. Having a good allocation in mind, a…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…
We propose and construct a quantum money scheme that allows verification through classical communication with a bank. This is the first demonstration that a secure quantum money scheme exists that does not require quantum communication for…
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
The no-cloning theorem can be used as a basis for quantum money constructions which guarantee unconditionally unforgeable currency. Existing schemes, however, either (i) require long-term quantum memory and quantum communication between the…
Suppose you run a home exam, where students should report their own scores but can cheat freely. You can, if needed, call a limited number of students to class and verify their actual performance against their reported score. We consider…
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other.…
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…
In this work we present a publicly verifiable quantum money protocol which assumes close to no quantum computational capabilities. We rely on one-time memories which in turn can be built from quantum conjugate coding and hardware-based…
Runtime Verification is a lightweight formal verification technique. It is used to verify at runtime whether the system under analysis behaves as expected. The expected behaviour is usually formally specified by means of properties, which…
Machine learning models are increasingly deployed for critical decision-making tasks, making it important to verify that they do not contain gender or racial biases picked up from training data. Typical approaches to achieve fairness…
In this paper, we introduce a model for donation verification. A randomized algorithm is developed to check if the money claimed being received by the collector is $(1-\epsilon)$-approximation to the total amount money contributed by the…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove…
Quantum money allows a bank to mint quantum money states that can later be verified and cannot be forged. Usually, this requires a quantum communication infrastructure to transfer quantum states between the user and the bank. Gavinsky (CCC…
Fairness is well studied in the context of resource allocation. Researchers have proposed various fairness notions like envy-freeness (EF), and its relaxations, proportionality and max-min share (MMS). There is vast literature on the…