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We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition.…
The auction of a single indivisible item is one of the most celebrated problems in mechanism design with transfers. Despite its simplicity, it provides arguably the cleanest and most insightful results in the literature. When the…
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently distributed. We focus on general joint distributions, seeking…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
We fully determine the communication complexity of approximating matrix rank, over any finite field $\mathbb{F}$. We study the most general version of this problem, where $0\leq r<R\leq n$ are given integers, Alice and Bob's inputs are…
We characterize the communication complexity of the following distributed estimation problem. Alice and Bob observe infinitely many iid copies of $\rho$-correlated unit-variance (Gaussian or $\pm1$ binary) random variables, with unknown…
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…
Traditional combinatorial spectrum auctions mainly rely on fixed bidding and matching processes, which limit participants' ability to adapt their strategies and often result in suboptimal social welfare in dynamic spectrum sharing…
It is unrealistic to assume that all nodes in an ad hoc wireless network would be willing to participate in cooperative communication, especially if their desired Quality-of- Service (QoS) is achievable via direct transmission. An…
We settle the complexities of the maximum-cardinality bipartite matching problem (BMM) up to poly-logarithmic factors in five models of computation: the two-party communication, AND query, OR query, XOR query, and quantum edge query models.…
In communication complexity the input of a function $f:X\times Y\rightarrow Z$ is distributed between two players Alice and Bob. If Alice knows only $x\in X$ and Bob only $y\in Y$, how much information must Alice and Bob share to be able to…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We study the asymptotic average-case efficiency of static and anonymous posted prices for $n$ agents and $m(n)$ multiple identical items with $m(n)=o\left(\frac{n}{\log n}\right)$. When valuations are drawn i.i.d from some fixed continuous…
We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approximately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider markets with $m$ indivisible items and $n$ buyers. The goal is to set prices to the items so that, when agents…
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic…
We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. The class we consider includes all auctions that allocate…
We study the problem of agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains. It is difficult to reach optimal agreements in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations when the agents' preferences for the possible alternatives are not common…
We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing…
Equality and disjointness are two of the most studied problems in communication complexity. They have been studied for both classical and also quantum communication and for various models and modes of communication. Buhrman et al. [Buh98]…
We consider the problem of implementing a fixed social choice function between multiple players (which takes as input a type $t_i$ from each player $i$ and outputs an outcome $f(t_1,\ldots, t_n)$), in which each player must be incentivized…