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The main conceptual contribution of this paper is investigating quantum multiparty communication complexity in the setting where communication is \emph{oblivious}. This requirement, which to our knowledge is satisfied by all quantum…
We consider the problem of bounded-error quantum state identification: given either state \alpha_0 or state \alpha_1, we are required to output `0', `1' or `?' ("don't know"), such that conditioned on outputting `0' or `1', our guess is…
We study the following communication variant of local search. There is some fixed, commonly known graph $G$. Alice holds $f_A$ and Bob holds $f_B$, both are functions that specify a value for each vertex. The goal is to find a local maximum…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the…
Prophet inequalities compare the expected performance of an online algorithm for a stochastic optimization problem to the expected optimal solution in hindsight. They are a major alternative to classic worst-case competitive analysis, of…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial…
Broadcast protocols enable a set of $n$ parties to agree on the input of a designated sender, even facing attacks by malicious parties. In the honest-majority setting, randomization and cryptography were harnessed to achieve…
We prove lower bounds for the direct sum problem for two-party bounded error randomised multiple-round communication protocols. Our proofs use the notion of information cost of a protocol, as defined by Chakrabarti, Shi, Wirth and Yao and…
Suppose we have a two-party communication protocol for $f$ which allows the parties to make queries to an oracle computing $g$; for example, they may query an Equality oracle. To translate this protocol into a randomized protocol, we must…
Along with substantial progress made recently in designing near-optimal mechanisms for multi-item auctions, interesting structural questions have also been raised and studied. In particular, is it true that the seller can always extract…
In the combinatorial-action contract model (D\"utting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given set of actions. Each set of actions incurs a cost to the…
We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N+1. The bids of the…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves…
We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and subadditive. We…
Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal is to understand…
We study the effect that the amount of correlation in a bipartite distribution has on the communication complexity of a problem under that distribution. We introduce a new family of complexity measures that interpolates between the two…