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We propose a probabilistic two-party communication complexity scenario with a prior nonmaximally entangled state, which results in less communication than that is required with only classical random correlations. A simple all-optical…
We consider an instance of the following problem: Parties P_1,..., P_k each receive an input x_i, and a coordinator (distinct from each of these parties) wishes to compute f(x_1,..., x_k) for some predicate f. We are interested in one-round…
The communication complexity of many fundamental problems reduces greatly when the communicating parties share randomness that is independent of the inputs to the communication task. Natural communication processes (say between humans)…
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings, distributions exist for which the seller's optimal…
We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is "approximately" optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is…
We continue the study of welfare maximization in unit-demand (matching) markets, in a distributed information model where agent's valuations are unknown to the central planner, and therefore communication is required to determine an…
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. [DMSW15] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of $O(\log m)$ for complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior…
In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of…
We prove an $N^{2-o(1)}$ lower bound on the randomized communication complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium (for constant $\epsilon>0$) in a two-player $N\times N$ game.
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…
We study revenue maximization in multi-item auctions, where bidders have subadditive valuations over independent items. Providing a simple mechanism that is approximately revenue-optimal in this setting is a major open problem in mechanism…
We study the communication complexity of a direct sum of independent copies of the equality predicate. We prove that the probabilistic communication complexity of this problem is equal to O(N); computational complexity of the proposed…
We show a near optimal direct-sum theorem for the two-party randomized communication complexity. Let $f\subseteq X \times Y\times Z$ be a relation, $\varepsilon> 0$ and $k$ be an integer. We show,…
The process of state preparation, its transmission and subsequent measurement can be classically simulated through the communication of some amount of classical information. Recently, we proved that the minimal communication cost is the…
In communication complexity-like problems, previous studies have shown either an exponential quantum advantage or an unbounded quantum advantage with an exponentially large input set $\Theta(2^{n})$ bits with respect to classical…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…
We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximately-optimal auctions in the context of the "FedEx" problem, a so-called "one-and-a-half-dimensional" setting where a single bidder has both a value and a deadline for receiving an…
We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the…