Related papers: On the geometric structures in evolutionary games …
We propose two new evolutionary rules that is not mimic evolution of strategies based on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The former follows the selfish evolutionary rule and then the coexistence phase appears with weak phase transition…
Complex networks are a great tool for simulating the outcomes of different strategies used within the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. However, because the strategies themselves rely on the connection between nodes, then initial network…
We introduce a non-diffusive spatial coupling term into the replicator equation of evolutionary game theory. The spatial flux is based on motion due to local gradients in the relative fitness of each strategy, providing a game-dependent…
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…
A new model of population dynamics on lattices is proposed. The model consists of players on lattice points, each of which plays the RSP game with neighboring players. Each player copies the next hand from the hand of the neighbouring…
We have studied an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with players located on two types of random regular graphs with a degree of 4. The analysis is focused on the effects of payoffs and noise (temperature) on the maintenance of…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the…
Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide…
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
We introduce a method of analyzing entanglement enhanced quantum games on regular lattices of agents. Our method is valid for setups with periodic and non-periodic boundary conditions. To demonstrate our approach we study two different…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…
This paper studies scenarios of cyclic dominance in a coevolutionary spatial model in which game strategies and links between agents adaptively evolve over time. The Optional Prisoner's Dilemma (OPD) game is employed. The OPD is an extended…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…