The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation
Dynamical Systems
2020-08-03 v3 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independently of the size of the population. Moreover, we show that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1205.0958,
title = {The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation},
author = {Pedro Dal Bó and Enrique R. Pujals},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1205.0958},
year = {2020}
}