Related papers: Knowledge and Blameworthiness
Causality is an important concept both for proving impossibility results and for synthesizing efficient protocols in distributed computing. For asynchronous agents communicating over unreliable channels, causality is well studied and…
We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
There has been considerable work on reasoning about the strategic ability of agents under imperfect information. However, existing logics such as Probabilistic Strategy Logic are unable to express properties relating to information…
We present a variant of ATL with distributed knowledge operators based on a synchronous and perfect recall semantics. The coalition modalities in this logic are based on partial observation of the full history, and incorporate a form of…
In this paper, we formalise and implement an agent model for cooperation under imperfect information. It is based on Theory of Mind (the cognitive ability to understand the mental state of others) and abductive reasoning (the inference…
Reasoning about observed effects and their causes is important in multi-agent contexts. While there has been much work on causality from an objective standpoint, causality from the point of view of some particular agent has received much…
Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence…
In this paper, we investigate the probabilistic variants of the strategy logics ATL and ATL* under imperfect information. Specifically, we present novel decidability and complexity results when the model transitions are stochastic and…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…
Though a lot of work in multi-agent systems is focused on reasoning about knowledge and beliefs of artificial agents, an explicit representation and reasoning about the presence/absence of agents, especially in the scenarios where agents…
We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory: permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexicographic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based on it, we…
Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic for many applications. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and awareness cannot express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of which…
When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…
This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…
We provide formal definitions of degree of blameworthiness and intention relative to an epistemic state (a probability over causal models and a utility function on outcomes). These, together with a definition of actual causality, provide…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…
The main approach to evaluating communication is by assessing how well it facilitates coordination. If two or more individuals can coordinate through communication, it is generally assumed that they understand one another. We investigate…
Data-based decisionmaking must account for the manipulation of data by agents who are aware of how decisions are being made and want to affect their allocations. We study a framework in which, due to such manipulation, data becomes less…