Related papers: Knowledge and Blameworthiness
There is a lively debate in the current literature on epistemology on which type of ignorance may provide a moral excuse. A good candidate is the one in which an agent has never thought about or considered as true a proposition $p$. From a…
Coalition Logic is primarily concerned with what coalitions can achieve, whereas what coalitions cannot achieve -- their \emph{inability} -- has received comparatively little explicit attention. This asymmetry matters in artificial…
We use the notion of a promise to define local trust between agents possessing autonomous decision-making. An agent is trustworthy if it is expected that it will keep a promise. This definition satisfies most commonplace meanings of trust.…
The notions of symmetry and anonymity in strategic games have been formalized in different ways in the literature. We propose a combinatorial framework to analyze these notions, using group actions. Then, the same framework is used to…
When a student fails an exam, do we tend to blame their effort or the test's difficulty? Attribution, defined as how reasons are assigned to event outcomes, shapes perceptions, reinforces stereotypes, and influences decisions. Attribution…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
We introduce a two layer network model for social coordination incorporating two relevant ingredients: a) different networks of interaction to learn and to obtain a payoff , and b) decision making processes based both on social and…
Causal models of agents have been used to analyse the safety aspects of machine learning systems. But identifying agents is non-trivial -- often the causal model is just assumed by the modeler without much justification -- and modelling…
This paper studies incomplete-information games in which an information provider, an oracle, publicly discloses information to the players. One oracle is said to dominate another if, in every game, it can replicate the equilibrium outcomes…
We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded…
We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives". Drawing on the "Bayesian Networks" literature, we model a narrative as a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection…
Coordination facilitation and efficient decision-making are two essential components of successful leadership. In this paper, we take an informational approach and investigate how followers' information impacts coordination and efficient…
We consider games with two antagonistic players --- \'Elo\"ise (modelling a program) and Ab\'elard (modelling a byzantine environment) --- and a third, unpredictable and uncontrollable player, that we call Nature. Motivated by the fact that…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
A key feature of human theory-of-mind is the ability to attribute beliefs to other agents as mentalistic explanations for their behavior. But given the wide variety of beliefs that agents may hold about the world and the rich language we…
Developing autonomous agents that can strategize and cooperate with humans under information asymmetry is challenging without effective communication in natural language. We introduce a shared-control game, where two players collectively…
This work studies the problem of ad hoc teamwork in teams composed of agents with differing computational capabilities. We consider cooperative multi-player games in which each agent's policy is constrained by a private capability…
We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium,…
Game theory provides a framework for studying communication dynamics and emergent phenomena arising from rational agent interactions. We present a model framework for the Volunteer's Dilemma with four key contributions: (1) formulating it…
Accountability is the property of a system that enables the uncovering of causes for events and helps understand who or what is responsible for these events. Definitions and interpretations of accountability differ; however, they are…