Towards A Logical Account of Epistemic Causality
Artificial Intelligence
2019-11-01 v1
Abstract
Reasoning about observed effects and their causes is important in multi-agent contexts. While there has been much work on causality from an objective standpoint, causality from the point of view of some particular agent has received much less attention. In this paper, we address this issue by incorporating an epistemic dimension to an existing formal model of causality. We define what it means for an agent to know the causes of an effect. Then using a counterexample, we prove that epistemic causality is a different notion from its objective counterpart.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1910.14217,
title = {Towards A Logical Account of Epistemic Causality},
author = {Shakil M. Khan and Mikhail Soutchanski},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.14217},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
In Proceedings CREST 2019, arXiv:1910.13641