Related papers: Combinatorial Algorithms for General Linear Arrow-…
A combinatorial market consists of a set of indivisible items and a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation function that specifies for each subset of items its value for the given agent. From an optimization point of view, the goal…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
Quasiliearity is a ubiquitous and questionable assumption in the standard study of Walrasian equilibria. Quasilinearity implies that a buyer's value for goods purchased in a Walrasian equilibrium is always additive with goods purchased with…
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the…
To overcome the #P-hardness of computing/updating prices in logarithm market scoring rule-based (LMSR-based) combinatorial prediction markets, Chen et al. [5] recently used a simple Bayesian network to represent the prices of securities in…
Algorithms for determining quality/cost/price tradeoffs in saturated markets are considered. A product is modeled by $d$ real-valued qualities whose sum determines the unit cost of producing the product. This leads to the following…
The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…
We study online combinatorial auctions with production costs proposed by Blum et al. using the online primal dual framework. In this model, buyers arrive online, and the seller can produce multiple copies of each item subject to a…
It is a common belief that computing a market equilibrium in Fisher's spending model is easier than computing a market equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu's exchange model. This belief is built on the fact that we have more algorithmic success in…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
We introduce a combinatorial optimization-enriched machine learning pipeline and a novel learning paradigm to solve inventory routing problems with stochastic demand and dynamic inventory updates. After each inventory update, our approach…
Designing automated market makers (AMMs) for prediction markets on combinatorial securities over large outcome spaces poses significant computational challenges. Prior research has primarily focused on combinatorial prediction markets…
In the rapidly evolving landscape of eCommerce, Artificial Intelligence (AI) based pricing algorithms, particularly those utilizing Reinforcement Learning (RL), are becoming increasingly prevalent. This rise has led to an inextricable…
This paper unifies two foundational constructs from economics and algorithmic game theory, the Arctic Auction and the linear Fisher market, to address the efficient allocation of differentiated goods in complex markets. Our main…
The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propose a framework for designing distributed algorithms with a…
We embed buying rights into a (repeated) Arrow-Debreu model to study the long-term effects of regulation through buying rights on arising inequality. Our motivation stems from situations that typically call for regulatory interventions,…
We present a new combinatorial market maker that operates arbitrage-free combinatorial prediction markets specified by integer programs. Although the problem of arbitrage-free pricing, while maintaining a bound on the subsidy provided by…
Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz (KKO) introduce a graph-theoretic generalization of the classic Arrow--Debreu (AD) exchange economy. Despite its appeal as a networked version of AD, we argue that the KKO model is too local, in the sense that…
The European market clearing problem is characterized by a set of heterogeneous orders and rules that force the implementation of heuristic and iterative solving methods. In particular, curtailable block orders and the uniform purchase…
We derive tractable necessary and sufficient conditions for the absence of buy-and-hold arbitrage opportunities in a perfectly liquid, one period market. We formulate the positivity of Arrow-Debreu prices as a generalized moment problem to…