Related papers: Combinatorial Algorithms for General Linear Arrow-…
This paper revisits the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework through the lens of effective trade, emphasizing the distinction between theoretical and realizable market interactions. We develop the Effective Trade Model (ETM), where…
For a wide variety of regularization methods, algorithms computing the entire solution path have been developed recently. Solution path algorithms do not only compute the solution for one particular value of the regularization parameter but…
Auction has been used to allocate resources or tasks to processes, machines or other autonomous entities in distributed systems. When different bidders have different demands and valuations on different types of resources or tasks, the…
In this paper, a mathematical negotiation mechanism is designed to minimize the negotiators' costs in a distributed procurement problem at two echelons of an automotive supply chain. The buyer's costs are procurement cost and shortage…
We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…
In this paper, inspired by the work of Megiddo on the formation of preferences and strategic analysis, we consider an early market model studied in the field of economic theory, in which each trader's utility may be influenced by the…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial…
We propose a general dual ascent framework for Lagrangean decomposition of combinatorial problems. Although methods of this type have shown their efficiency for a number of problems, so far there was no general algorithm applicable to…
We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of forbidden over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal…
We study revenue optimization pricing algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation. We show that, in the case when both the seller and the buyer…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining…
We consider an online multi-weighted generalization of several classic online optimization problems, called the online combinatorial assignment problem. We are given an independence system over a ground set of elements and agents that…
We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…
Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network. Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific auction scenarios…
With the growing use of distributed machine learning techniques, there is a growing need for data markets that allows agents to share data with each other. Nevertheless data has unique features that separates it from other commodities…
Pen testing is the problem of selecting high-capacity resources when the only way to measure the capacity of a resource expends its capacity. We have a set of $n$ pens with unknown amounts of ink and our goal is to select a feasible subset…
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length $n$, are decided in an adversarial, online…
The optimal pricing problem is a fundamental problem that arises in combinatorial auctions. Suppose that there is one seller who has indivisible items and multiple buyers who want to purchase a combination of the items. The seller wants to…