Related papers: Shapley-like values without symmetry
Oftentimes, the Shapley value becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of homogeneous group games by using an…
In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an…
Explaining AI systems is fundamental both to the development of high performing models and to the trust placed in them by their users. The Shapley framework for explainability has strength in its general applicability combined with its…
Originally introduced in game theory, Shapley values have emerged as a central tool in explainable machine learning, where they are used to attribute model predictions to specific input features. However, computing Shapley values exactly is…
The Shapley value provides a principled framework for fairly distributing rewards among participants according to their individual contributions. While prior work has applied this concept to data valuation in machine learning, existing…
We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation…
We consider MultiCriteria Decision Analysis models which are defined over discrete attributes, taking a finite number of values. We do not assume that the model is monotonically increasing with respect to the attributes values. Our aim is…
We introduce a game-theoretic approach to the study of recommendation systems with strategic content providers. Such systems should be fair and stable. Showing that traditional approaches fail to satisfy these requirements, we propose the…
The Shapley value (SV) and Least core (LC) are classic methods in cooperative game theory for cost/profit sharing problems. Both methods have recently been proposed as a principled solution for data valuation tasks, i.e., quantifying the…
This paper proposes a novel approach to explain the predictions made by data-driven methods. Since such predictions rely heavily on the data used for training, explanations that convey information about how the training data affects the…
We introduce a new allocation rule, the uniform-dividend value (UD-value), for cooperative games whose characteristic function is incomplete. The UD-value assigns payoffs by distributing the total surplus of each family of indistinguishable…
In this paper, we provide a theoretically grounded and computationally efficient alternative to SHAP. To this end, we study feature attribution through the lens of cooperative game theory by formulating a class of XAI--TU games. Building on…
In 1953, Lloyd Shapley defined the model of stochastic games, which were the first general dynamic model of a game to be defined, and proved that competitive stochastic games have a discounted value. In 1982, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois Mertens and…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of…
The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in…
As the decisions made or influenced by machine learning models increasingly impact our lives, it is crucial to detect, understand, and mitigate unfairness. But even simply determining what "unfairness" should mean in a given context is…
Feature selection is a classical problem in statistics and machine learning, and it continues to remain an extremely challenging problem especially in the context of unknown non-linear relationships with dependent features. On the other…
Definable zero-sum stochastic games involve a finite number of states and action sets, reward and transition functions that are definable in an o-minimal structure. Prominent examples of such games are finite, semi-algebraic or globally…
How to design a fair and reasonable allocation plan for the common revenue of the alliance is considered in this paper. We regard the common revenue to be allocated as an exogenous variable which will not participate in the subsequent…
In this work, we define cooperative games on simplicial complexes, generalizing the study of probabilistic values of Weber and quasi-probabilistic values of Bilbao, Driessen, Jim\'{e}nez Losada and Lebr\'{o}n. Applications to Multi-Touch…