Related papers: Shapley-like values without symmetry
We consider transferable-utility profit-sharing games that arise from settings in which agents need to jointly choose one of several alternatives, and may use transfers to redistribute the welfare generated by the chosen alternative. One…
We propose a variant of the Shapley value, the group Shapley value, to interpret counterfactual simulations in structural economic models by quantifying the importance of different components. Our framework compares two sets of parameters,…
We make two contributions to the study of polite combination in satisfiability modulo theories. The first contribution is a separation between politeness and strong politeness, by presenting a polite theory that is not strongly polite. This…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…
Can we predict how well a team of individuals will perform together? How should individuals be rewarded for their contributions to the team performance? Cooperative game theory gives us a powerful set of tools for answering these questions:…
Several extensions of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value to the family of games with a priori unions are proposed in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2020) ``On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori…
Probabilistic graphical models, such as Markov random fields (MRF), exploit dependencies among random variables to model a rich family of joint probability distributions. Sophisticated inference algorithms, such as belief propagation (BP),…
Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…
Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy efficiency. Despite their desirable normative properties, this…
Data valuation has become an increasingly significant discipline in data science due to the economic value of data. In the context of machine learning (ML), data valuation methods aim to equitably measure the contribution of each data point…
This paper investigates some necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to be a potential game. At first, we extend the classical results of Slade and Monderer and Shapley from games with one-dimensional action spaces to games with…
Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…
Shapley value is a concept from game theory. Recently, it has been used for explaining complex models produced by machine learning techniques. Although the mathematical definition of Shapley value is straight-forward, the implication of…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
The Shapley-Shubik index was designed to evaluate the power distribution in committee systems drawing binary decisions and is one of the most established power indices. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the…
This paper develops a unified framework for zero-sum games in which both the pure strategies and the payoff matrices contain complex-valued entries. By leveraging a linear isomorphism between complex and real vector spaces, we extend key…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…