Related papers: Shapley-like values without symmetry
This paper establishes a complete theoretical foundation for the Hodge-theoretic extension of the Shapley value introduced by Stern and Tettenhorst (2019). We show that a set of five axioms--efficiency, linearity, symmetry, a modified…
Over the last few years, the Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, has found numerous applications in machine learning. In this paper, we first discuss fundamental concepts of cooperative game theory and axiomatic…
Shapley values, a game theoretic concept, has been one of the most popular tools for explaining Machine Learning (ML) models in recent years. Unfortunately, the two most common approaches, conditional and marginal, to calculating Shapley…
Additive feature explanations using Shapley values have become popular for providing transparency into the relative importance of each feature to an individual prediction of a machine learning model. While Shapley values provide a unique…
Originally introduced in cooperative game theory, Shapley values have become a very popular tool to explain machine learning predictions. Based on Shapley's fairness axioms, every input (feature component) gets a credit how it contributes…
We introduce the notion of linearly representable games. Broadly speaking, these are TU games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like weighted voting games, airport games, or bankruptcy games. We show that…
We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…
Collaborative machine learning enables multiple data owners to jointly train models for improved predictive performance. However, ensuring incentive compatibility and fair contribution-based rewards remains a critical challenge. Prior work…
In this article, we provide an axiomatic characterization of feature attribution for multi-output predictors within the Shapley framework. While SHAP explanations are routinely computed independently for each output coordinate, the…
We propose a novel definition of Shapley values with uncertain value functions based on first principles using probability theory. Such uncertain value functions can arise in the context of explainable machine learning as a result of…
We define a general framework of partition games for formulating two-player pebble games over finite structures. We show that one particular such game, which we call the invertible-map game, yields a family of polynomial-time approximations…
M\"obius inversion and Shapley values are two mathematical tools for characterizing and decomposing higher-order structure in complex systems. The former defines higher-order interactions as discrete derivatives over a partial order; the…
We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…
The Shapley value has become popular in the Explainable AI (XAI) literature, thanks, to a large extent, to a solid theoretical foundation, including four "favourable and fair" axioms for attribution in transferable utility games. The…
The problem of explaining the behavior of deep neural networks has recently gained a lot of attention. While several attribution methods have been proposed, most come without strong theoretical foundations, which raises questions about…
Despite their ubiquitous use, Shapley value feature attributions can be misleading due to feature interaction in both model and data. We propose an alternative attribution approach, Shapley Sets, which awards value to sets of features.…
We introduce and study the axiom of null player neutrality in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games). This axiom weakens the classical coalitional strategic equivalence: rather than requiring that augmenting a…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, kidney…
We study efficient, linear, and symmetric (ELS) values, a central family of allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable-utility (TU-games) that includes the Shapley value, the CIS value, and the ENSC value. We first show that…