Related papers: Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy with Res…
We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium,…
We expect that democracy enables us to utilize collective intelligence such that our collective decisions build and enhance social welfare, and such that we accept their distributive and normative consequences. Collective decisions are…
In this work, we investigate interactions that simultaneously order a system locally, while keeping it globally disordered. The study is done in the context of the emergence of diversity in opinion propagation models with interactions…
We view a complex liquid as a network of bonds connecting each particle to its nearest neighbors; the dynamics of this network is a chain of discrete events signaling particles rearrangements. Within this picture, we studied a…
A classical model of fluid dynamics is considered which describes the shape evolution of a viscous liquid droplet on a homogeneous substrate. All equilibria are characterized and their stability is analyzed by a geometric reduction…
The executive branch, or government, is typically not elected directly by the people, but rather formed by another elected body or person such as the parliament or the president. As a result, its members are not directly accountable to the…
We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our power indices are natural extensions of the standard…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
In linear models of consensus dynamics, the state of the various agents converges to a value which is a convex combination of the agents' initial states. We call it democratic if in the large scale limit (number of agents going to infinity)…
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of…
The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less about the overall governing coalition than the individual…
Leader Election is an important primitive for programmable matter, since it is often an intermediate step for the solution of more complex problems. Although the leader election problem itself is well studied even in the specific context of…
This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…
The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…
Vibrations can dynamically stabilize otherwise unstable liquid interfaces and produce new dynamic equilibria, called vibro-equilibria. Typically, the vibrations are homogeneous in the liquid and the liquid interface remains approximately…
The majority vote model is one of the simplest opinion systems yielding distinct phase transitions and has garnered significant interest in recent years. However, its original formulation is not, in general, thermodynamically consistent,…
This short paper puts forward a vision for a new democratic model enabled by the recent technological advances in agentic AI. It therefore opens with drawing a clear and concise picture of the model, and only later addresses related…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
Are there voting methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status…
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but…