Related papers: Approximating Bimatrix Nash Equilibrium Via Trilin…
A bimatrix game $(A,B)$ is called a game of rank $k$ if the rank of the matrix $A+B$ is at most $k$. We consider the problem of enumerating the Nash equilibria in (non-degenerate) games of rank 1. In particular, we show that even for games…
Disjointly constrained multilinear programming concerns the problem of maximizing a multilinear function on the product of finitely many disjoint polyhedra. While maximizing a linear function on a polytope (linear programming) is known to…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden…
A celebrated result in the interface of online learning and game theory guarantees that the repeated interaction of no-regret players leads to a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) -- a natural game-theoretic solution concept. Despite the…
This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…
For a mean field game model with a major and infinite minor players, we characterize a notion of Nash equilibrium via a system of so-called master equations, namely a system of nonlinear transport equations in the space of measures. Then,…
We consider the symmetric Toeplitz matrix completion problem, whose matrix under consideration possesses specific row and column structures. This problem, which has wide application in diverse areas, is well-known to be computationally…
We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the…
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…
In this paper, we first devise two algorithms to determine whether or not a bimatrix game has a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If so, we propose an algorithm that computes the strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If a given…
This paper studies the problem of selecting a submatrix of a positive definite matrix in order to achieve a desired bound on the smallest eigenvalue of the submatrix. Maximizing this smallest eigenvalue has applications to selecting input…
Motivated by emerging resource allocation and data placement problems such as web caches and peer-to-peer systems, we consider and study a class of resource allocation problems over a network of agents (nodes). In this model, nodes can…
In this letter, we study dynamic game optimal control with imperfect state observations and introduce an iterative method to find a local Nash equilibrium. The algorithm consists of an iterative procedure combining a backward recursion…
We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data…
Save for some special cases, current training methods for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are at best guaranteed to converge to a `local Nash equilibrium` (LNE). Such LNEs, however, can be arbitrarily far from an actual Nash…
This short paper concerns discretization schemes for representing and computing approximate Nash equilibria, with emphasis on graphical games, but briefly touching on normal-form and poly-matrix games. The main technical contribution is a…
We consider a class of hierarchical variational inequality (VI) problems that subsumes VI-constrained optimization and several other problem classes including the optimal solution selection problem and the optimal Nash equilibrium (NE)…
In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…
New type III and type N approximate solutions which are regular in the linear approximation are shown to exist. For that, we use complex transformations on self-dual Robinson-Trautman metrics rather then the classical approach. The…