Related papers: Approximating Bimatrix Nash Equilibrium Via Trilin…

The linear complementarity problem, LCP(q,M), is defined as follows. For given M,q find z such that q+Mz>=0, z>=0, z(q + M z)=0,or certify that there is no such z. It is well known that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for a…

Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game…

Linear complementarity programming is a generalization of linear programming which encompasses the computation of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games. While the latter problem is PPAD-complete, we show that the tropical analogue of the…

This paper is an exposition of algorithms for finding one or all equilibria of a bimatrix game (a two-player game in strategic form) in the style of a chapter in a graduate textbook. Using labeled "best-response polytopes", we present the…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

The Boolean product $R = P \cdot Q$ of two $\{ 0, 1\} \; m \times m \; $ matrices is $$R(j,k) = 1 \; \mathrm{\ IF\ for\ some\ } \; t \; \,P(j, t) = Q(t, k) = 1\; \; \mathrm{ELSE\ } \, R(j, k) = 0. $$ The near-optimal design reduces the…

Multi-agent robust reinforcement learning, also known as multi-player robust Markov games (RMGs), is a crucial framework for modeling competitive interactions under environmental uncertainties, with wide applications in multi-agent systems.…

Nash Equilibrium and its robust counterpart, Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium (DRNE), are fundamental problems in game theory with applications in economics, engineering, and machine learning. This paper addresses the problem of…

In this thesis, we settle the computational complexity of some fundamental questions in polynomial optimization. These include the questions of (i) finding a local minimum, (ii) testing local minimality of a point, and (iii) deciding…

We study the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria $\mathcal X_\star \times \mathcal Y_\star$ in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Fearnley and Savani (2016) showed that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an $n…

We study the sample complexity of identifying the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in a two-player zero-sum matrix game with noise. Formally, we are given a stochastic model where any learner can sample an entry $(i,j)$ of the input…

We study the convergence to local Nash equilibria of gradient methods for two-player zero-sum differentiable games. It is well-known that such dynamics converge locally when $S \succ 0$ and may diverge when $S=0$, where $S\succeq 0$ is the…

In many contexts one encounters Hermitian operators $M$ on a Hilbert space whose dimension is so large that it is impossible to write down all matrix entries in an orthonormal basis. How does one determine whether such $M$ is positive…

Motivated by the sequence form formulation of Koller et al. (GEB'96), this paper defines {\em bilinear games}, and proposes efficient algorithms for its rank based subclasses. Bilinear games are two-player non-cooperative single-shot games…

In this work, we seek a more refined understanding of the complexity of local optimum computation for Max-Cut and pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) computation for congestion games with weighted players and linear latency functions. We show that…

This paper makes progress towards learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov games from offline data. Specifically, consider a $\gamma$-discounted infinite-horizon Markov game with $S$ states, where the max-player has $A$…

The normalized maximized likelihood (NML) provides the minimax regret solution in universal data compression, gambling, and prediction, and it plays an essential role in the minimum description length (MDL) method of statistical modeling…

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

We consider a two-person trading game in continuous time whereby each player chooses a constant rebalancing rule $b$ that he must adhere to over $[0,t]$. If $V_t(b)$ denotes the final wealth of the rebalancing rule $b$, then Player 1 (the…

Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…