Related papers: A Note on the Complexity of Manipulating Weighted …
Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters…
Multi-objective unconstrained combinatorial optimization problems (MUCO) are in general hard to solve, i.e., the corresponding decision problem is NP-hard and the outcome set is intractable. In this paper we explore special cases of MUCO…
A classic result of Lenstra [Math.~Oper.~Res.~1983] says that an integer linear program can be solved in fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) time for the parameter being the number of variables. We extend this result by incorporating…
Power indices are essential in assessing the contribution and influence of individual agents in multi-agent systems, providing crucial insights into collaborative dynamics and decision-making processes. While invaluable, traditional…
Deciding in an efficient way weak probabilistic bisimulation in the context of Probabilistic Automata is an open problem for about a decade. In this work we close this problem by proposing a procedure that checks in polynomial time the…
We investigate the complexity of several manipulation and control problems under numerous prevalent approval-based multiwinner voting rules. Particularly, the rules we study include approval voting (AV), satisfaction approval voting (SAV),…
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…
We study the control complexity of fallback voting. Like manipulation and bribery, electoral control describes ways of changing the outcome of an election; unlike manipulation or bribery attempts, control actions---such as…
We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this…
By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to which different voting methods are more or less resistant to…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the…
We investigate the parameterized complexity of strategic behaviors in generalized scoring rules. In particular, we prove that the manipulation, control (all the 22 standard types), and bribery problems are fixed-parameter tractable for most…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random…
Strategic voting, or manipulation, is the process by which a voter misrepresents his preferences in an attempt to elect an outcome that he considers preferable to the outcome under sincere voting. It is generally agreed that manipulation is…
We introduce two-crossing elections as a generalization of single-crossing elections, showing a number of new results. First, we show that two-crossing elections can be recognized in polynomial time, by reduction to the well-studied…
The Possible Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated candidate can become a winner by suitably extending all the votes. Betzler and Dorn [1]…
Real-life agents seldom have unlimited reasoning power. In this paper, we propose and study a new formal notion of computationally bounded strategic ability in multi-agent systems. The notion characterizes the ability of a set of agents to…
Collective decision making processes lie at the heart of many social, political and economic challenges. The classical voter model is a well-established conceptual model to study such processes. In this work, we define a new form of…
We demonstrate that a small modification of the multiplicative, additive and restricted additive Schwarz preconditioner at the algebraic level, motivated by optimized Schwarz methods defined at the continuous level, leads to a significant…
This paper presents an algorithm, Voted Kernel Regularization , that provides the flexibility of using potentially very complex kernel functions such as predictors based on much higher-degree polynomial kernels, while benefitting from…