Related papers: $k$th price auctions and Catalan numbers
The Catalan number $C_n$ enumerates parenthesizations of $x_0*\dotsb*x_n$ where $*$ is a binary operation. We introduce the modular Catalan number $C_{k,n}$ to count equivalence classes of parenthesizations of $x_0*\dotsb*x_n$ when $*$…
Let p be any odd prime. We mainly show that $$\sum_{k=1}^{p-1}binomial(3k,k)*2^k/k=0 (mod p)$$ and $$\sum_{k=1}^{p-1}2^{k-1}C_k^{(2)}=(-1)^{(p-1)/2}-1 (mod p),$$ where $C_k^{(2)}=binomial(3k,k)/(2k+1)$ is the $k$th Catalan number of order…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
While there has been some progress on the decomposition of Kronecker products of characters of the symmetric groups in recent times, results on the symmetric and alternating part of Kronecker squares are still scarce. Here, new results (and…
We present a simple dynamic equilibrium model for an online exchange where both buyers and sellers arrive according to a exogenously defined stochastic process. The structure of this exchange is motivated by the limit order book mechanism…
We consider the k-th order statistic from unit exponential distribution and show that it can be represented as a sum of independent exponential random variables. Our proof is simple and different. It readily proves that the standardized…
In this paper, we present a new model and two mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model incorporates polymatroidal environments, and is applicable to a wide…
It is well known that the Catalan number C_n counts dissections of a regular (n+2)-gon into triangles. Here we count such dissections by number of triangles that contain two sides of the polygon among their three edges, leading to a…
Assuming standard conjectures, we show that the canonical symmetrizing trace evaluated at powers of a Coxeter element produces rational Catalan numbers for irreducible spetsial complex reflection groups. This extends a technique used by…
We calculate moments of the so-called Kesten distribution by means of the expansion of the denominator of the density of this distribution and then integrate all summands with respect to the semicircle distribution. By comparing this…
High-stakes auctions are often preceded by nonbinding communication between bidders and the seller. Motivated by these practices, this paper examines a two-period model in which two bidders send private cheap talk messages to the seller…
Writing the values of Krawtchouk polynomials as matrices, we consider weighted partial sums along columns. For the general case, we find an identity that, in the symmetric case yields a formula for such partial sums. Complete sums of…
The eigenvalue probability density function for symplectic invariant random matrix ensembles can be generalised to discrete settings involving either a linear or exponential lattice. The corresponding correlation functions can be expressed…
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…
We are interested in the problem of optimal commitments in rank-and-bid based auctions, a general class of auctions that include first price and all-pay auctions as special cases. Our main contribution is a novel approach to solve for…
The causal effect of showing an ad to a potential customer versus not, commonly referred to as "incrementality", is the fundamental question of advertising effectiveness. In digital advertising three major puzzle pieces are central to…
We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. We…
In previous work on Clebsch-Gordan coefficients, certain remarkable hexagonal arrays of integers are constructed that display behaviors found in Pascal's Triangle. We explain these behaviors further using the binomial transform and discrete…
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…