Related papers: $k$th price auctions and Catalan numbers
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for the $k$th price auction by using inverse of distribution functions. As applications, we identify the unique symmetric equilibrium where the valuations have polynomial…
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for $k$- price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for…
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal…
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an…
In this paper we consider combinatorial numbers $C_{m, k}$ for $m\ge 1$ and $k\ge 0$ which unifies the entries of the Catalan triangles $ B_{n, k}$ and $ A_{n, k}$ for appropriate values of parameters $m$ and $k$, i.e., $B_{n,…
The binomial coefficients and Catalan triangle numbers appear as weight multiplicities of the finite-dimensional simple Lie algebras and affine Kac--Moody algebras. We prove that any binomial coefficient can be written as weighted sums…
In this paper, we revisit the common claim that double auctions necessarily generate competitive equilibria. We begin by observing that competitive equilibrium has some counterintuitive implications: specifically, it predicts that monotone…
Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this…
While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and computational methods to investigate whether incorporating…
We show that a competitive equilibrium always exists in combinatorial auctions with anonymous graphical valuations and pricing, using discrete geometry. This is an intuitive and easy-to-construct class of valuations that can model both…
Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…
We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…
We analyze a weighted convolution of Catalan numbers $$ \sum_{k=0}^{n} \binom{2k}{k}\binom{2(n-k)}{n-k} a^k = \sum_{k=0}^{n} (k+1)(n-k+1) C_k C_{n-k} a^k, $$ emphasizing its combinatorial, analytic, and probabilistic aspects. We derive a…
We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…
Weighted Catalan numbers are a class of weighted sums over Dyck paths. Well-studied for their arithmetic properties and applications to enumerative combinatorics, these numbers were recently generalized to the setting of $k$-dimensional…
The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this reason we are interested in solutions which…
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
For each integer $k\ge 1$, we define an algorithm which associates to a partition whose maximal value is at most $k$ a certain subset of all partitions. In the case when we begin with a partition $\lambda$ which is square, i.e…