Related papers: Schelling Segregation with Strategic Agents
This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…
We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly…
The occurrence of discrimination is an important problem in the social and economical sciences. Much of the discrimination observed in empirical studies can be explained by the theory of in-group favoritism, which states that people tend to…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…
Schelling's model considers $k$ types of agents each of whom needs to select a vertex on an undirected graph, where every agent prefers to neighbor agents of the same type. We are motivated by a recent line of work that studies solutions…
We study a Stackelberg game to examine how two agents determine to cooperate while competing with each other. Each selects an arrival time to a destination, the earlier one fetching a higher reward. There is, however, an inherent penalty in…
How should cities invest to improve social welfare when individuals respond strategically to local conditions? We model this question using a game-theoretic version of Schelling's bounded neighbourhood model, where agents choose…
A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a central planner who can enforce how these systems are utilized,…
Strategic classification studies learning in settings where self-interested users can strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. A key working assumption, however, is that "favorable" always means…
Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…
As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual…
Social dilemmas are situations where groups of individuals can benefit from mutual cooperation but conflicting interests impede them from doing so. This type of situations resembles many of humanity's most critical challenges, and…
Agents with different ideologies often form alliances to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, ideologically similar agents are often opponents. In this paper, ideologically heterogeneous agents choose the ideological composition of their…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
Covering and packing problems can be modeled as games to encapsulate interesting social and engineering settings. These games have a high Price of Anarchy in their natural formulation. However, existing research applicable to specific…
We introduce the study of sequential information elicitation in strategic multi-agent systems. In an information elicitation setup a center attempts to compute the value of a function based on private information (a-k-a secrets) accessible…
We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…