Related papers: Schelling Segregation with Strategic Agents
Studying the impact of cooperation in strategic settings is one of the cornerstones of algorithmic game theory. Intuitively, allowing more cooperation yields equilibria that are more beneficial for the society of agents. However, for many…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
We develop a game-theoretic framework for predicting and steering the behavior of populations of large language models (LLMs) through Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis. To avoid the intractability of equilibrium computation in open-ended text…
Today we rely on networks that are created and maintained by smart devices. For such networks, there is no governing central authority but instead the network structure is shaped by the decisions of selfish intelligent agents. A key…
We study the dynamics of the Naming Game [Baronchelli et al., (2006) J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. P06014] in empirical social networks. This stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of…
Envy shapes competitiveness and cooperation in human groups, yet its role in large language model interactions remains largely unexplored. As LLMs increasingly operate in multi-agent settings, it is important to examine whether they exhibit…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
The traditional approach to the quantitative study of segregation is to employ indices that are selected by ``desirable properties''. Here, we detail how information theory underpins entropy-based indices and demonstrate how desirable…
In this paper we study variations of the standard Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition, where each agent attracts the clients in a restricted neighborhood, each client randomly picks one attractive agent for service. Two utility…
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the…
In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the…
This paper proposes a spatial model with a realistic geography where a continuous distribution of agents (e.g., farmers) engages in economic interactions with one location from a finite set (e.g., cities). The spatial structure of the…
In this work, we consider a population composed of a continuum of agents that seek to maximize a payoff function by moving on a network. The nodes in the network may represent physical locations or abstract choices. The population is…
This paper studies an online variant of the celebrated housing market problem, where each agent has a single house and seeks to exchange it for another based on her preferences. In this online setting, agents may arrive and depart at any…
Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the price of anarchy in such models. We demonstrate the…
We offer a search-theoretic model of statistical discrimination, in which firms treat identical groups unequally based on their occupational choices. The model admits symmetric equilibria in which the group characteristic is ignored, but…
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model describing voluntary social distancing during the spread of an epidemic. The payoffs of the agents depend on the social distancing they practice and on the probability of getting infected. We…
We present a simple one-parameter model for spatially localised evolving agents competing for spatially localised resources. The model considers selling agents able to evolve their pricing strategy in competition for a fixed market. Despite…
We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…