Related papers: Unobservable False Data Injection Attacks against …
This letter proposes a novel, fully distributed, transient-safe resilient secondary control strategies for AC microgrids, addressing unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks on control input channels. Unlike existing methods that focus…
This paper investigates the vulnerability of bilateral teleoperation systems to perfectly undetectable False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs). Teleoperation, one of the major applications in robotics, involves a leader manipulator operated by…
In recent studies, moving target defense (MTD) has been applied to detect false data injection (FDI) attacks using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. However, the inherent conflict between the security goals of…
The phasor measurement unit (PMU) placement problem is revisited by taking into account a stronger characterization of the electrical connectedness between various buses in the grid. To facilitate this study, the placement problem is…
FDI (False Data Injection) attacks are critical to address as they can compromise the integrity and reliability of data in cyber-physical systems, leading to potentially severe consequences in sectors such as power systems. The feasibility…
Security issues have gathered growing interest within the control systems community, as physical components and communication networks are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. In this context, recent literature has studied increasingly…
This paper presents an information-theoretic approach to address the phasor measurement unit (PMU) placement problem in electric power systems. Different from the conventional 'topological observability' based approaches, this paper…
Real time operation of the power grid and synchronism of its different elements require accurate estimation of its state variables. Errors in state estimation will lead to sub-optimal Optimal Power Flow (OPF) solutions and subsequent…
Physical consequences to power systems of false data injection cyber-attacks are considered. Prior work has shown that the worst-case consequences of such an attack can be determined using a bi-level optimization problem, wherein an attack…
Artificial neural network (ANN) provides superior accuracy for nonlinear alternating current (AC) state estimation (SE) in smart grid over traditional methods. However, research has discovered that ANN could be easily fooled by adversarial…
This paper is concerned with the problem of secure multi-sensors fusion estimation for cyber-physical systems, where sensor measurements may be tampered with by false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this work, it is considered that the…
Cyber-physical system (CPS) is the foundational backbone of modern critical infrastructures, so ensuring its security and resilience against cyber-attacks is of pivotal importance. This paper addresses the challenge of designing anomaly…
Federated learning is a technique that allows multiple entities to collaboratively train models using their data without compromising data privacy. However, despite its advantages, federated learning can be susceptible to false data…
State estimation estimates the system condition in real-time and provides a base case for other energy management system (EMS) applications including real-time contingency analysis and security-constrained economic dispatch. Recent work in…
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) represent a major class of attacks that aim to break the integrity of measurements by injecting false data into the smart metering devices in power grids. To the best of authors' knowledge, no study has…
Most traditional false data injection attack (FDIA) detection approaches rely on a key assumption, i.e., the power system can be accurately modeled. However, the transmission line parameters are dynamic and cannot be accurately known during…
As one of the largest and most complex systems on earth, power grid (PG) operation and control have stepped forward as a compound analysis on both physical and cyber layers which makes it vulnerable to assaults from economic and security…
This paper outlines a cyber-physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks. We demonstrate that it is feasible to use small, low-cost, yet highly attack-resistant security…
We study moving-target defense (MTD) that actively perturbs transmission line reactances to thwart stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in a power grid. Prior work on this topic has proposed MTD based on…
Over the last few decades, extensive use of information and communication technologies has been the main driver of the digitalization of power systems. Proper and secure monitoring of the critical grid infrastructure became an integral part…