Related papers: Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching,…
Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality,…
We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between the corresponding points in the space. The goal is to…
Motivated by recent work in computational social choice, we extend the metric distortion framework to clustering problems. Given a set of $n$ agents located in an underlying metric space, our goal is to partition them into $k$ clusters,…
We study the problem of locating a single obnoxious facility on the normalized line segment $[0,1]$ with strategic agents from a mechanism design perspective. Each agent has a preference for the undesirable location of the facility and…
We present a randomized distributed approximation algorithm for the metric uncapacitated facility location problem. The algorithm is executed on a bipartite graph in the Congest model yielding a (1.861 + epsilon) approximation factor, where…
Given facilities with capacities and clients with penalties and demands, the transportation problem with market choice consists in finding the minimum-cost way to partition the clients into unserved clients, paying the penalties, and into…
In Facility Location problems there are agents that should be connected to facilities and locations where facilities may be opened so that agents can connect to them. We depart from Uncapacitated Facility Location and by assuming that the…
We consider ordinal approximation algorithms for a broad class of utility maximization problems for multi-agent systems. In these problems, agents have utilities for connecting to each other, and the goal is to compute a maximum-utility…
Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, ordinal rankings are often the only available…
In the $k$-committee election problem, we wish to aggregate the preferences of $n$ agents over a set of alternatives and select a committee of $k$ alternatives that minimizes the cost incurred by the agents. While we typically assume that…
Facility location problems often permit facilities to be located at any position. But what if this is not the case in practice? What if facilities can only be located at particular locations like a highway exit or close to a bus stop? We…
We study a discrete fair division problem where $n$ agents have additive valuation functions over a set of $m$ goods. We focus on the well-known $\alpha$-EFX fairness criterion, according to which the envy of an agent for another agent is…
This paper is devoted to the two-opposite-facility location games with a penalty whose amount depends on the distance between the two facilities to be opened by an authority. The two facilities are "opposite" in that one is popular and the…
We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…
The \textit{facility location} problem consists of a set of \textit{facilities} $\mathcal{F}$, a set of \textit{clients} $\mathcal{C}$, an \textit{opening cost} $f_i$ associated with each facility $x_i$, and a \textit{connection cost}…
We study a competitive facility location problem (CFLP), where two firms sequentially open new facilities within their budgets, in order to maximize their market shares of demand that follows a probabilistic choice model. This process is a…
We consider the {\em mobile facility location} (\mfl) problem. We are given a set of facilities and clients located in a common metric space. The goal is to move each facility from its initial location to a destination and assign each…
We consider a voting problem in which a set of agents have metric preferences over a set of alternatives, and are also partitioned into disjoint groups. Given information about the preferences of the agents and their groups, our goal is to…
The $k$-Facility Location problem is a generalization of the classical problems $k$-Median and Facility Location. The goal is to select a subset of at most $k$ facilities that minimizes the total cost of opened facilities and established…
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where ex-ante and ex-post efficiency coincide, offer a unifying…