Related papers: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching …

Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \emph{bidding games}, showing the existence…

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know about the game. This is embedded in a model in which players can hold multiple priors.…

We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…

In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…

We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…

I study how organisations choose selection procedures in a competitive environment. Two firms compete to hire candidates of unknown productivity from a common pool. Firms simultaneously post a selection procedure which consists of a test…

This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…

In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…

Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…

We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…

We study multi-player turn-based games played on (potentially infinite) directed graphs. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We…

We expand on earlier research on the topic by discussing an infinitely repeated game model with a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile (SPE) as a solution concept that diminishes incentives to violate speed limits in a carrot and…

Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…

We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…

In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…

In dynamic games with asymmetric information structure, the widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This is expressed as a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and…

In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…

The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…