Related papers: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching …
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
Similar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Stochastic Games (SGs) lay the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and sequential agent interactions. In this paper, we derive…
We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…
This paper studies a multi-player, general-sum stochastic game characterized by a dual-stage temporal structure per period. The agents face uncertainty regarding the time-evolving state that is realized at the beginning of each period.…
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium for imperfect-information extensive-form games (EFGs) that enforces consistency between the two components of a solution: agents' strategy profile describing their…
We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
This paper analyzes a steady state matching model interrelating the education and labor sectors. In this model, a heterogeneous population of students match with teachers to enhance their cognitive skills. As adults, they then choose to…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this…
We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…
Machine learning has grown in popularity to help assign resources and make decisions about users, which can result in discrimination. This includes hiring markets, where employers have increasingly been interested in using automated tools…