Related papers: Preference Cycles in Stable Matchings
We analyse preference inference, through consistency, for general preference languages based on lexicographic models. We identify a property, which we call strong compositionality, that applies for many natural kinds of preference…
A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We provide several structural insights that improve our…
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…
Given a bipartite graph G = (A u B, E) with strict preference lists and and edge e*, we ask if there exists a popular matching in G that contains the edge e*. We call this the popular edge problem. A matching M is popular if there is no…
This paper introduces an extension of Answer Set Programming called Preference Set Constraint Programming which is a convenient and general formalism to reason with preferences. PSC programming extends Set Constraint Programming introduced…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stability of heteroclinic cycles of the symmetric May-Leonard competition model with seasonal succession. Sufficient conditions for stability of heteroclinic cycles are obtained. Meanwhile, we…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
Fair classification has been a topic of intense study in machine learning, and several algorithms have been proposed towards this important task. However, in a recent study, Friedler et al. observed that fair classification algorithms may…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
We propose a framework for model-theoretic stability and simplicity in an approximate first-order setting and generalize some classical results.
In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent those situations where, due to lack of information,…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
The purpose of this note is to give a number of open problems on matching theory and their relation to the well-known results in this area. We also give a linear analogue of the acyclic matchings.
This paper examines the classical matching distribution arising in the "problem of coincidences". We generalise the classical matching distribution with a preliminary round of allocation where items are correctly matched with some fixed…
We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…